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Originating Lender Bank Liability to Participants in the B-
Tranche of a Leveraged Loan: Mending the Gap Between
Federal Banking and Federal Securities Regulation
I. INTRODUcTION
Traditionally, banks loaned money to borrowers with whom they
had a direct relationship. This direct relationship gave banks direct
access to the borrower, its collateral, and its current financial infor-
mation. Thus, when these borrowers defaulted on a loan, the lending
banks could seek recourse against the borrower to recover their
losses. In recent years, however, banks have explored non-traditional
methods of lending. One example of such non-traditional lending is
loan participation. In a loan participation program, the originating
bank lends money to a borrower, but then sells interests in the un-
derlying loan to third party participants. Loan participation
programs can be simple or complex. The originating lender may sell
participations in a single-tiered loan, or it may divide a large loan fa-
cility into an A-tranche1 and a longer B-tranche, and sell
participations with differing maturities in the two tranches.
Unlike the relationship between the bank and borrower in a tra-
ditional loan, a third-party participant in a loan participation does not
have a direct relationship with the borrower and cannot take re-
course against the borrower to recover its losses should the borrower
default. Thus, in an effort to minimize their losses, some participants
have sought to recoup their losses from the originating bank. Such
participants try to prove (1) that they purchased a "security" rather
than a "traditional loan participation" from the originating lender
bank, and (2) that the originating bank made materially false or mis-
leading statements about the borrower's credit condition. The
participant's motive is to solicit the protections of the federal securi-
ties laws. Under the securities laws, if the participant proves that the
loan participation is a security, and that the originating bank made
false or misleading statements, then the participant may rescind the
participation agreement under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933' or receive damages from the originating bank under Section
1. "Tranches" are portions of a loan.
2. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994)
[hereinafter 1933 Act].
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10b(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.? In the recent deci-
sion of Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
the assertion that a loan participation note is a security.4
This Comment will discuss the sale of participations in the B-
tranche of a leveraged loan to institutional investors. Leveraged
lending is the practice of providing credit to a firm with a low credit
rating and a high debt-to-equity ratio.' In order to minimize its expo-
sure to these risky borrowers, a bank will underwrite a leveraged loan
and then divide the loan into "tranches"-portions with differing ma-
turity dates.6 The tranches are given letter designations based on
increasing maturities.7 Principal payments are made on the tranche
with the shortest maturity (the A-tranche) first.8 Once that tranche is
paid off, principal payments on the tranche with the next shortest ma-
turity begin. Thus, the longer tranches do not receive principal
payments until the shorter maturities are paid in full or retired. Most
commonly, a leveraged loan will be divided into an A-tranche loan
and a B-tranche loan.9 The A-tranche has a relatively short maturity
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781-1 (1994)
[hereinafter 1934 Act].
4. 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992). In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), the
Supreme Court resolved circuit conflict over which test should be applied to determine if
a note is a security by adopting the family resemblance test. Banco Espanol is the first
post-Reves decision to address whether a loan participation is a security under the family
resemblance test. See e.g., Richard Roberts & Randall W. Quinn, Financial Services
Regulation; A Mid Decade Review: Essay: Leveling the Playing Field The Need For
Investor Protection for Bank Sales of Loan Participations, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2115,
2127 (1995) (noting that Banco Espanol is the only court of appeals decision addressing
loan notes as securities).
5. See Leveraged Loans Jump, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Nov. 7, 1996, at B1
(describing leveraged lending as "bank lending to lower-rated companies").
6. See Lyn Perlmuth, Option B for Highly Leveraged Borrowers, 27 INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR 229 (1993) (discussing how originating banks minimize their exposure to risky
corporations by arranging B-tranche loans that can be sold to prime rate funds, insurance
companies, and other banks). Although commercial banks purchase B-Tranche participa-
tions, they typically do so through their trading and investment departments. See Banco
Espanol, 973 F.2d at 57 (Oakes, C.J. dissenting) (noting that although commercial banks
were involved in the loan participation program, most of the commercial banks purchased
participations through their investment and trading departments).
7. See Daniel Dunaief, Finding Profit in the Longer-Term Parts of Loans, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 20, 1994, at 24 [hereinafter Dunaief, Finding Profit].
8. See Joseph V. Rizzi, Comment: Leveraged Lending Should Remain Strong, But
Watch Out for Slipping Credit Quality, AM. BANKER, June 9, 1995, at 22 (noting that the
lower tranches of a multi-tranche loan typically begin amortizing after the bank-held
loans retire).
9. See LPC-Siligan Corp B Term Loan To Grow by $125 Min, REUTERS FIN. SERV.,
June 10, 1996 [hereinafter LPC-Siligan Corp] (describing use of a B-tranche in a $675
million credit backing of Siligan Corp in order to take advantage of liquidity in the secon-
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(commonly, five years), and like a traditional bank loan, typically re-
quires repayment of a substantial amount of principal prior to
maturity.'0 The B-tranche has a longer maturity than its A-tranche
counterpart, and the borrower is permitted to repay all of the princi-
pal at maturity (bullet amortization), or beginning in the last two
years of maturity (back-ended amortization)." Thus, the lender may
not receive payments on the B-tranche for an extended period of
time. In order to avoid lengthy exposure to default and interest rate
risks, the originating bank sells participations in the B-tranche to
nonbank institutions, mutual funds, prime rate mutual funds,12 and
pension funds. 3
This Comment will consider the likelihood that loan notes evi-
dencing participation interests in the B-tranche of a leveraged loan
participation would be deemed securities subject to the federal secu-
rities laws' investor protections against nondisclosure,
misrepresentation, and fraud. 4 Part II describes the decline of tradi-
tional banking activities during the 1980s, and examines the
development of variations on the traditional bank loan participation
scheme as designed by commercial banks to respond to increasing
competition in the financial markets. 5 Part III discusses commercial
banks' increasing involvement in leveraged lending, and describes
dary lending market). Bankers have also begun to offer "C" and "D" tranches with even
longer maturities and richer pricing than B-tranche loans. See LPC-High-Yield "B"
Loans Soar As Pricing Falls, REUTERS FIN. SERV., June 4, 1996 [hereinafter LPC-High-
Yield].
10. See James S. Altschul, Junk Bonds With Ballast, CFO: THE MAGAZINE FOR
SENIOR FINANCIAL EXECUTIvES, Nov. 1993, at 61, 62 (noting that a traditional seven
year bank facility might require repayment of a minimum of 3/4 of principal prior to ma-
turity).
11. See generally LPC-High-Yield, supra note 9 (describing the lengthier maturities,
richer pricing and back-ended amortization of Tranche-B loans). Amortizing assets repay
principal gradually, thereby reducing the lender's exposure to the borrower over time. In
contrast, nonamortizing assets pay the principal amount of the loan in full on the date of
maturity. Back-ended amortizing assets begin repaying principal in periodic payments
beginning in the later years of maturity. See id.
12. See Ben Edwards, Let's Shuttle Those Loans, EUROMONEY No. 316, at 22, 23
(1995) (defining prime rate funds as closed-end mutual funds that specialize in loan in-
vesting).
13. See LPC-High Yield, supra note 9 (noting that B-tranche loans are "marketed
almost always exclusively to prime rate funds and other non-bank institutions interested
in higher-yielding, floating-rate term debt"); LPC-Siligan, supra note 9 (noting that a
Loan Pricing Corp. survey of prime rate funds showed that there was $25 to $30 billion
available from prime rate funds, insurance companies, and other institutional investors to
fund B-tranche loans).
14. For a brief discussion of remedies available under the federal securities laws, see
infra note 129 and note 221.
15. See infra notes 21-81 and accompanying text.
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how commercial banks use B-tranche loan participation programs to
minimize their exposure to highly leveraged borrowers.16 Part IV dis-
cusses the adoption of the "family resemblance test" as the
appropriate analytical framework for analyzing whether certain loan
participations are securities within the meaning of the securities
laws. 7 Part IV also examines the Second Circuit's application of the
"family resemblance test" to participations in debt instruments in
Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank8 and
Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings." Finally, Part V examines participa-
tions in the B-tranches of leveraged loans under the "family
resemblance test," and concludes that Congress should amend the
statutory definition of "security" to include certain loan participa-
tions.'
II. THE DECLINE IN THE PROFITABILITY OF TRADITIONAL
BANKING AND THE EVOLUTION OF LOAN PARTICIPATIONS
A. What Is a Loan Participation?
A loan participation is a "contract which sells the cash stream
from an underlying bank loan to a third party."'" This contract is
typically in the form of a loan participation agreement between the
originating bank and one or more third-party participants.2 The loan
participation agreement does not give rise to a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship between the participants and the borrower; only the
originating bank holds a formal contract with the borrower.' The
originating bank makes a loan to a customer, but then funds the loan
16. See infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 104-62 and accompanying text.
18. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992).
19. Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir.); see infra notes 124-67 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 163-231 and accompanying text.
21. Gary B. Gorton & Joseph G. Haubrich, The Loan Sales Market, in 2 RESEARCH
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 85, 85 (George Kaufman ed., 1990).
22. See Bradley Anderson, Loan Participations and The Borrower's Bankruptcy, 64
AM. BANKR. L.J. 39,40 (1990).
23. See Robert 0. Weinke, Loan Syndications and Participations: Trends and Tactics,
COMMERCIAL LENDING REVIEW, Spring 1994, available in LEXIS, Banking Library, BIS
File [hereinafter Weinke, Loan Syndications]. Syndicated lending can either take the
form of direct lending with assignments, or indirect lending with participations. For pur-
poses of this Comment, "participation" shall refer to the sale of an indirect interest in the
loan by the originating bank to the participant. This should be distinguished from a direct
form of syndication where the originating bank "sells off and assigns a pro rata interest in
the loan to another lender that directly enters into a lending arrangement with the bor-
rower." Id. (emphasis added).
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by selling participations in the borrower's principal and interest pay-
ments to third parties. 4 The originating bank continues to manage
the loan and serves as a conduit for payments between the borrower
and the participants.' The participant is not involved in the
"underwriting or negotiation of the loan, is not named in the loan
documents as a lender, has no direct recourse against the borrower,
and does not have a security interest in the collateral pledged by the
borrower to secure the loan."26 Moreover, the loan participation
agreement does not guarantee the value of the loan and explicitly
deprives the participant of any recourse against the originating
bank.2 ' Thus, by selling participations to fund all or a portion of a
loan, the originating bank can profit from loan origination fees and
some of the interest on the loan, even though its has shifted most or
all of the default and interest rate risks to participants.
2
8
B. Traditional Loan Participation Schemes Versus Nontraditional
Loan Participation Schemes
The sale of loan participation interests is not a novel idea; banks
have been selling participations in their loans to other banks for dec-
ades.29 However, contemporary, nontraditional loan participation
programs differ greatly from traditional loan participation pro-
grams? Traditionally, banks sold participations to enhance their
24. See id.
25. See Robert R. Kornegay, Jr., Comment, Bank Loans as Securities: A Legal and
Financial Economic Analysis of the Treatment of Marketable Bank Assets Under the
Securities Acts, 40 UCLA L. REv. 799, 820 (1993) (noting that the originating bank is
responsible for collecting payments from the borrower and forwarding them to partici-
pants).
26. Weinke, Loan Syndications, supra note 23.
27. See generally David L. Eaton, Trouble with the Syndicate: Avoiding Disputes
Over Syndicated Loan Documents and Participation Agreements in Insolvency, LENDER
LIABILITY NEWS, Nov. 3, 1995 (noting that participation agreements normally state that
"a) there is no agency relationship between the lead and the participant; b) amounts re-
ceived from the borrower are not held in trust for the participant's benefit; c) the lead
bank has no fiduciary responsibilities to the participant; and d) the participant has no
ownership interest in the borrower's loan itself, or in any collateral therefor"). The provi-
sions of the participation agreement protect the bank against claims of negligence or
breach of fiduciary duty for withholding information regarding the borrower's financial
situation.
28. See Kornegay, supra note 25, at 803 n.13 (noting that loan participation agree-
ments allow banks to spread the credit risk of a loan while still profiting from origination
and servicing fees).
29. See John V. Murray & Anthony F. Vittone, The Banking and Securities Businesses
and the Recondite Line Between Them, 110 BANKING L.J. 388,409 (1993).
30. See Kornegay, supra note 25, at 826 (noting that changing financial markets in the
1980s "altered banks' motivation to sell loans, the characteristics of the loans being sold,
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commercial lending activities.31 When a corporate borrower de-
manded more money than the bank could provide under its
regulatory lending limits, the bank would sell participations to other
banks to fund the excess amount.3' Although these participations did
not give rise to a direct relationship between the participating banks
and the borrower, the originating bank typically granted participating
banks the opportunity to conduct independent credit evaluation and
due diligence on the borrower. 3 Since the participants were other
banks that were experienced in lending and credit evaluation, they
were able to effectively assess the risks involved in a particular loan
participation34 In contrast to the predominately bank-held participa-
tions of early loan participation programs, loan participations are
now mass marketed outside of the banking community to nonbank
institutions and funds.35 The participation agreements in these non-
traditional loan participation programs no longer afford participants
with direct access to the borrower or the originating bank's records
on the loan to facilitate an independent credit evaluation of the bor-
rower's financial situation 6 Moreover, many of these institutional
investors are not in the lending business and they lack the expertise
to effectively evaluate the creditworthiness of the borrower and the
risk involved in the loan.37 Thus, they are forced to rely on public
documents regarding the borrower, or any information provided by
the originating bank in order to assess the risk involved in a certain
loan participation.38 In addition, to buy a participation, purchasers
are required to sign a participation agreement which states that the
and the make-up of loan purchasers").
31. See id. (stating that banks used participations to solve overline loan problems).
32. See id2 at 826 n.80. The National Bank Act limits the amount a national bank may
lend to a single borrower to a percentage of the bank's capital and surplus. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 84 (1994). However, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ruled that portions
of loans funded by participations are not counted in the selling bank's lending limits. See
12 C.F.R. § 32.107.
33. See Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2117-18 (noting that early loan participa-
tion programs only involved a "handful of participants" who were given access to the
company's collateral and finance records and had the right and the expertise to conduct
their own inspections on the borrower).
34. See id.
35. See LPC-High-Yield, supra note 9 (noting that B-tranche loans are marketed
"almost exclusively to prime rate funds and other non-bank institutions interested in
higher-yielding, floating-rate term debt").
36. See Martin G. Byrne, Loan Participation Interests as Securities, REV. OF






purchaser "warrants that its purchase was made solely upon its own
independent evaluation of creditworthiness and the seller states that
it makes no representation or warranty as to collectibility or other
matters relating to the loan or its security."" Thus, not only are pur-
chasers denied access to the borrower's private financial records, they
also disclaim any reliance on the bank to disclose information on the
borrower's financial situation.' This arrangement allows banks to
restrict the amount of information they pass on to participants,
thereby allowing them to sell low quality loans to inadequately in-
formed purchasers, with no liability for nondisclosure.
4'
C. Forces Behind the Growth of Nontraditional Loan Participations:
The Commercial Paper Market and Conservative Lending
Practices of the 1990s
The sale of loan participations exploded in the 1980s and, despite
a slight decline, has remained substantial in the 1990s.42 Among oth-
ers, two significant forces in the financial markets have helped bolster
the continued growth of loan participation sales since the early 1980s.
First, a decline in the profitability of traditional banking has forced
banks to diversify their activities in order to satisfy earnings and
growth expectations.43 Selling loan participations allows banks to
"earn fee income while avoiding (1) the capital requirements of
placing a loan on the balance sheet and (2) the reserve requirements
of taking on a liability to fund the loan."" In addition, loan participa-
tions served as a "competitive response" by commercial banks to
"investment banks' ability to underwrite lower-risk commercial pa-
per."45 Second, after the failure of many banks in the late 1980s,
39. Edward P. Mannino, New Developments in Lender Liability Litigation, LENDER
LIABILITY NEwS, July 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, Banking Library, LRP File.
40. For a list of provisions that originating banks include in participation agreements
to eschew any fiduciary relationship between the originating bank and the borrower, see
supra note 27.
41. See generally Gorton & Haubrich, supra note 21, at 87 (noting that banks are
increasingly selling participations to a wider audience).
42. See generally Weinke, Loan Syndications, supra note 23 (noting the continued
growth of loan syndications and participations evidenced by a 66% increase from $234
billion in 1983, to $389 billion in 1993).
43. See generally Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Decline of Tradi-
tional Banking: Implications for Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, 1 ECON. POL'Y
REV. 27 (July 1995) (explaining the economic forces that have undercut the profitability
of traditional commercial lending activities).
44. Kornegay, supra note 25, at 841.
45. Id.; see also Edwards & Mishkin supra note 43, at 31.
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banks began to adopt a more conservative approach to lending. 6 In-
stead of holding a few large loans on their balance sheet, loan
participations allow banks to actively manage and diversify their loan
portfolios by keeping small portions of various loans on their balance
sheet.'
1. Decline in the Profitability of Traditional Banking
Changes in the financial services industry in the late 1970s and
1980s forced banks to change their traditional operations.4 Prior to
the 1980s, commercial banks held a competitive lending advantage
over other lending institutions due to their ability to provide low cost
credit to borrowers. 9 Commercial banks gathered customer deposits,
and used them to provide bank credit for commercial and consumer
customers." Due to low regulatory ceilings on the amount of interest
banks were allowed to pay customers on their deposits, these cus-
tomer deposits provided banks with a low cost source of funds that
they could use to issue commercial and consumer loans." However,
with a rise in inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s, depositors be-
came increasingly dissatisfied with the low amount of interest their
money was earning in bank deposits." These depositors (particularly
corporations) began looking for ways to earn higher interest on their
46. See Weinke, Loan Syndications, supra note 23 (stating that the growth of loan
participations "is attributable to the more conservative lending practices of the 1990s").
47. See Randall Devere, Besieged, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., Sept. 2, 1996, at 12
(noting that commercial banks aim to diversify their risks by actively managing their loan
portfolios in order to achieve "light exposure to a greater variety of companies, sectors,
and industries").
48. See generally Edwards & Mishkin, supra note 43, at 31 (discussing the way in
which increased competition for depositors' funds and growth of finance companies as
competitive lenders has diminished commercial banks' traditional cost advantage in
lending and thereby undercut their profitability).
49. See id. at 4 (noting that the zero interest cost on checkable deposits, which were a
major source of bank funds, resulted in a low average cost of funds for commercial
banks).
50. See id. at 27 (discussing the traditional banking activity of "borrowing short and
lending long").
51. A lot of post-depression legislation focused on maintaining the soundness and
security of the banking system and protecting bank depositors. Federal banking regula-
tions prevented banks from paying interest on checkable deposits and placed caps on the
amount of interest that could be paid on savings and other time deposits. Federal Re-
serve Board Reg. G, 12 C.F.R. § 217. Many of these caps were eliminated or relaxed over
a six-year period following Congress' adoption the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980. See Murray & Vittone, supra note 29, at 405 n.96.
52. See Edwards & Mishkin, supra note 43, at 31 (asserting that increased inflation
made depositors more sensitive to yield differentials on different assets).
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balances in order to keep pace with inflation.53 In addition to the in-
terest rate ceilings on depository funds, the Banking Act of 1933
(commonly known as Glass-Steagall)' further precluded the ability
of commercial banks to respond to their depositors demands for
higher yields. Glass-Steagall was passed after the depression to pro-
tect the security of the banking system by prohibiting banks from
underwriting or marketing securities.5 Congress determined that al-
lowing commercial banks to invest in risky securities would be
incompatible with protecting depositors' funds. 6 In addition, Con-
gress sought to avoid the conflicts of interest that might arise when a
commercial bank "goes beyond the business of acting as a fiduciary
or managing agent and develops a pecuniary interest in marketing
securities. ' Due to commercial banks' inability to provide custom-
ers with market rate returns, depositors began to pull their money
out of commercial bank deposits and invest it in the commercial pa-
per market or money market mutual funds."8
53. See id.
54. See Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
55. See id. Glass-Steagall was passed by Congress in order to separate commercial
bank activities from investment bank activities "as completely as possible." Board of
Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,70 (1981). Section 16 of the Banking Act
of 1933 prohibits commercial banks from underwriting "securities or stock." Section 21
prohibits commercial banks from marketing "stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other
securities."
56. See Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System No. 82-1766 (1984).
57. Id.
58. See Murray & Vittone, supra note 29, at 403-08 (describing the development of
money market funds and the commercial paper market and the outflow of cash from
commercial banks). During the 1980s banks were increasingly losing their depositors to
the commercial paper market and money market mutual funds. Providing low cost credit
was no longer an easy task for commercial banks. Deposits were down and commercial
banks were forced to look elsewhere to find sources to fund their traditional lending ac-
tivities. Traditionally banks profited from the interest rate differential between the low
interest rate they paid depositors, and the higher interest rate charged on loans (minus
the cost of FDIC insurance on the loan). However, without sufficient depository funds as
a source of credit, banks were forced to go out and borrow at market rates to raise funds.
Many banks suffered losses from a failure to match maturities on the funds they lent and
the funds they borrowed. For example, a bank would offer certificates of deposit (CD)
with a two year maturity, paying 7% interest, in order to fund a loan with a seven year
maturity at 10% interest. The bank assumed it would gain a profit from the interest rate
differential. However, the CDs would mature after 2 years, and the bank would have to
borrow again to fund the remainder of the loan. If interest rates had risen to over 11%,
then the bank would have been forced to borrow at 11% to lend money out at 10%. Fail-
ure to match maturities in this manner led to huge losses for many commercial banks. See
generally Edwards & Mishkin, supra note 43 (discussing the decline in the profitability of
commercial banking).
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Unconstrained by the banking regulations, investment banks re-
sponded to the bank depositors' demands for higher returns by
sponsoring innovatively designed money market mutual funds.59 In a
money market mutual fund, customers invest their money in a fund
which invests in money market instruments. ° These funds offer cus-
tomers market rate returns, but also allow them to write checks
against their investment. The investment company further protects
customers' ability to access their deposits by standing ready to buy
back customers' shares at their current net asset value.61
Commercial bank credit also faced competition from the
emerging commercial paper market.62 In the 1980s, businesses seek-
ing financing began to borrow directly from the public by issuing
short-term unsecured promissory notes (commercial paper), which
offered investors a higher rate of return than bank deposits.63 Pur-
chasers of commercial paper have historically included banks,
business corporations, insurance companies, government entities, and
pension funds.' The growth of money market mutual funds5 also
created a "ready market" for commercial paper, since money market
mutual funds are required to hold "liquid, high-quality, short-term
assets."66
In sum, in order to reach former profit levels, commercial banks
were forced to "minimize their traditional business of gathering de-
posits and transforming them into bank credit for commercial and
consumer customers, and increase their role as the distributor of fi-
nancial and investment products."67 Thus, banks began to use loan
participations to compete with investment bankers who could under-
write commercial paper for corporations at a lower cost than
59. See Murray & Vittone, supra note 29, at 405-06.
60. Money market instruments are short-term credit instruments including U.S.
Treasury bills, bankers' acceptances, commercial paper, finance paper, short-term tax
exempts, jumbo market interest rate bank certificates of deposits, U.S. government and
agency repurchase agreements or commercial paper, and other private or government
obligations with a maturity of less than one year.
61. See Murray & Vittone, supra note 29, at 405 (noting that money market funds
offer customers prompt access to their funds).
62. See id. at 403-04.
63. Commercial paper is an unsecured obligation. Repayment is dependent on the
issuer's ability to repay the debt from general revenues.
64. See Murray & Vittone, supra note 29, at 404.
65. Growth of assets in money market mutual funds reached more than $500 billion
by 1995. See Edwards & Mishkin, supra note 43, at 31.
66. See id. at 31 (noting that by creating a "ready market" for commercial paper,
money market funds further undercut the profitability of commercial banks).
67. Murray & Vittone, supra note 29, at 406.
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traditional commercial bank loans."
2. Conservative Lending of the 1990s Calls for Loan Participations
In the early 1980s, banks were eager to take part in leveraged
buy-outs and real estate development loans. To fund these large loan
facilities, banking attorneys "tested the bounds of regulatory limits."69
Only when a bank reached its own lending limits would it resort to
loan participations to fund the excess amount of credit needed.0
Consequently, when these loans failed, the losses for many banks
were devastating. As a result of the harsh lessons of the 1980s,
banks now use loan participations to avoid large exposure to risky
loans. Banks underwrite the loan and then target a selldown of their
exposure to well below their maximum credit limits.' In a leveraged
loan, the originating bank breaks the loan down into tranches and
aggressively markets participations in the lower tranches to institu-
tional investors, including insurance companies, mutual funds, and
pension funds.7 Using participations to fund the loan removes the
bulk of the loan from the originating bank's balance sheet.75 Senior
lending officers favor this approach to leveraged loans because it al-
lows them to earn high fees, while freeing up capital and avoiding
absorption of all of the risks inherent in a loan onto their own
books.76 Unfortunately, this can have an adverse affect on investors.
In a loan participation scheme, the originating bank "remains closest
to the borrower and is the most cost efficient gatherer of informa-
tion."' Consequently, if a bank knows that it has superior knowledge
of the borrower's credit condition and that the participants are not
likely to otherwise obtain this information, the bank may have an in-
centive to withhold negative credit information and sell low quality
loans to third party participants.78 Thus, as a bank moves loans off its
68. See Kornegay, supra note 25, at 841.
69. Weinke, Loan Syndications, supra note 23.
70. See id.
71. See id.; see also Edwards & Mishkin, supra note 43, at 32 (noting that bank fail-
ures from 1960 to 1980 averaged less than ten per year, but during the 1980s averaged
more than 200 a year).
72. See Weinke, Loan Syndications, supra note 23.
73. See id.
74. See Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2119; see also, e.g., Perlmuth, supra note 6,
at 229 (discussing sales to institutional investors and prime rate, pension, or mutual
funds).
75. See Gorton & Haubrich, supra note 21, at 120-123.
76. See Weinke, Loan Syndications, supra note 23.
77. Kornegay, supra note 25, at 821.
78. See id. at 817-24 (asserting that there are two ways in which "economic dishonesty
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balance sheet, borrower credit standards and evaluation may de-
cline.79 This can result in the sale of participations in low quality
loans to nonbank institutional investors.'o Losses by participants to
troubled loans have led to litigation which has brought to the fore-
front the question of whether certain nontraditional loan
participations are "notes" that are "securities."'"
III. LEVERAGED LENDING IN THE 1990S
A. Growth in Leveraged Lending
Leveraged lending soared to a record volume of $104.2 billion in
the first nine months of 1996. Due to an overall decline in pricing in
the loan market in recent years,' commercial banks (and investment
banks) are eager to provide leveraged loans to non-investment grade
firms.' These loans have traditionally offered rich pricing relative to
leading to asymmetric information" threatens the loan sales market). The first reason
that economic dishonesty leads to asymmetric information is because the bank, as origina-
tor, "can best assess the quality of loans being sold and has incentives to market low-
quality assets (the adverse selection problem)." I The second reason that economic
dishonesty leads to asymmetric information is because the bank, as servicer, "is instru-
mental in determining the actual yield that a buyer realizes on the assets and has an
incentive to shirk its responsibilities in monitoring the loan (the moral hazard problem)."
Id
79. See Gorton & Haubrich, supra note 21, at 85-86 (describing the paradoxical rela-
tionship that arises when the participant relies on the bank to reveal credit risks and
enforce loan covenants against the borrower even though the sale of the loan removes the
bank's incentive to perform on the original contract).
80. See generally Kornegay, supra note 25 (noting that an originating bank, which
holds private information about the borrower, may be tempted to sell bad loans).
81. See generally Weinke, Loan Syndications, supra note 23 (noting that a recurring
problem for originating banks is loan participants claiming they purchased a security in-
stead of a loan participation).
82. See Daniel Dunaief, Leveraged Lending Soared 51% During 2d Quarter, To Rec-
ord $3Z2 Billion, AM. BANKER, July 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Banking Library,
AMBANK File [hereinafter Dunaief, Leveraged Lending Soared]. This represented a
51% increase over the first quarter and was attributed to both refinancings and leveraged
buyouts. See id Leveraged loan volume has increased significantly in recent years,
growing from approximately $28 billion in 1993, to over $81 billion in 1994, to $101.3 bil-
lion in 1995, to $104.2 billion in the first nine months of 1996. See id; see also Joseph
Rizzi, Capitalize On Shifting Market Opportunities: Lending Frenzy Rewards Borrowers
16 CORP. CASHFLOW 30,30 (1995). Investment banks are moving into leveraged lending.
See Business Lines Converging At Banks, BANK LOAN REP., Sept. 30, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Busfin Library, IDD File (noting the movement of investment banks into "the
commercial banks sweetspot: leveraged lending") [hereinafter Business Lines Converg-
ing].
83. See, e.g., LPC-High Yield, supra note 9 (noting that overall loan pricing hit




investment grade loans.' The attractive pricing of leveraged loans to
non-investment grade borrowers reflects the default risks involved in
lending to a firm with a low credit rating and high debt-to-equity
(leverage) ratio. Due to the high leverage ratio of the borrowing
firm, repayment of the loan is a direct function of the borrower's
ability to generate future cash flow."' In order to minimize their ex-
posure to the borrower's credit condition for the maturity of the loan,
(and to compete for non-investment grade borrowers by offering
them longer maturities and less demanding amortization schedules),
banks have begun to innovatively structure loans.8
B. Structuring the Loan to Account for Inherent Risks
Analysis of a borrower's overall leverage is used to determine
the structure of the loan." The key leverage measurement a lender
looks at is debt to free operating cash flow (FOCF), 9 defined as
earnings before interest, depreciation, amortization, and taxes
(EBIDAT) minus capital expenditures."' Based on the borrower's
leverage, the lender can determine the maximum supportable level of
principal and interest obligations that can be ascertained given the
character and level of the company's cash flow stream.9' Based on
this debt capacity determination, the lender structures the loan.
92
85. See Rizzi, Slipping Credit, supra note 8, at 22 (recognizing leveraged lending as a
"profit engine" for banks compared to the unattractive pricing of investment grade
loans). Leveraged loans are loans priced at 150 basis points or more over Libor. See
Business Lines Converging, supra note 82.
86. See, e.g., James V. Lentino & Joseph V. Rizzi, Credit Analysis for the Highly Lev-
eraged Credits: Deja Vu All Over Again, 11 COM. LENDING REV. 21, 21 (1996)
[hereinafter Lentino & Rizzi, Deja Vu] (noting that "a leveraged capital structure in-
creases the fixed contractual financial obligations over a firm's cash flow stream").
87. See NationsBank Sees the Present as the Glory Days in Syndication Market, Bank
Loan Report, Sept. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, IDD File (noting that
having created the pricing grid concept for loans and also having introduced loans as
marketable assets into the institutional market, the leveraged lending market is "the most
innovative market there is").
88. See generally Lentino & Rizzi, Deja Vu, supra note 86, at 21 (noting that "the
analysis of structure begins with the overall leverage of the company").
89. Free operating cash flow refers to cash flow available for debt service once a bor-
rowing firm meets the cash flow demands necessary to operate its basic business. See id.
at 21.
90. See ic; see also Joseph V. Rizzi, Determining Debt Capacity, 9 COM. LENDING
REV. 25,25 (1994).
91. See Lentino & Rizzi, Deja Vu, supra note 86, at 21.
92. See id.; see also Kenneth C. White, LBO Financing, Trends, and Concerns, 343
PLI REA 499, 580 (noting that credit analysis in a leveraged loan transaction looks at
cash flow, not traditional factors like profitability and balance sheet strength).
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Increased competition in the leveraged loan market has led to
innovative and aggressively structured loan transactions.93 Many bor-
rowers need financing but cannot afford to have all their debt mature
at one time.94 To address these borrowers' needs, as well as to protect
themselves from the credit risks of a leveraged loan, lenders now
structure loans in different tranches, offering longer maturities and
back-ended amortization95 in the lower tranches. Each tranche is as-
signed a different rating ranging from AAA down into unrated
territory. Banks keep portions of the less risky A-tranches (due to a
shorter maturity and more demanding amortization schedule) for
themselves, and aggressively market B-tranches to nonbank institu-
tional investors. The riskier B-tranche loans begin amortizing after
retirement of the bank-held Tranche-A loans.96
The lengthier maturities and back-ended amortization of B-
tranche loans make their default risks high." This is because in a lev-
eraged loan, the borrower's ability to repay its debt is based on cash
flow coverage ratios and B-tranche investors are exposed to the bor-
rower and cash flow risks for a longer period of time." However, the
riskiness of the loan transaction provides high-yields for B-tranche
investors." Luckily, an "improving economy" in the 1990s has re-
stored investor confidence just as low interest rates have forced them
"to seek higher returns to maintain portfolio yields as higher-yielding
assets mature."1°° To reach these higher yields, investors have be-
come more willing to assume the higher levels of risk inherent in
leveraged debt transactions. 1' In response, commercial banks have
begun to act like brokers, transforming B-tranche leveraged loans
into marketable instruments and selling them to investors with an
appetite for high-yield investments." Many of these institutions, af-
ter experiencing losses from investments in loan participations, claim
93. See generally Lentino & Rizzi, Deja Vu, supra note 85 (noting that banks are in-
creasingly offering multi-tiered loans with longer maturities to appeal to companies who
need financing but need to moderate their fixed-charge burdens).
94. See Dunaief, Finding Profit, supra note 7, at 24.
95. Amortization refers to the retirement of debt over a period of time.
96. See Dunaief, Finding Profit, supra note 7, at 24.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., B of A Running Pacificare Acquisition Deal, 11 BANK LOAN REP. 10, 10
(1996) (referring to institutions lining up to purchase participations in the acquisition
deal's B-tranche).






that they were unable to assess the risk of loan participation; there-
fore, the originating bank that sold them the instrument without
disclosing its risks should be liable for their losses. These institutions
are essentially arguing that although they are a sophisticated entity,
"that institutional sophistication is limited in scope and that they are
no more sophisticated than a widow or an orphan in the area of com-
plex financial instruments."'' 3  Thus, in the context of loan
participation, those institutional investors, which are not in the busi-
ness of lending or credit evaluation, are in need of the investor
protections provided by the securities laws.
Iv. THE REVES "FAMILY RESEMBLANCE TEST" FOR SECURITIES
A. The Statutory Construct. Definition of "Security" Under the
Securities Act of 1933 and Security Exchange Act of 1934
The securities laws were enacted by Congress "to regulate in-
vestments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name
they are called."' Thus, in Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act 5 and Sec-
tion 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act," Congress broadly defined 'security' 07
to include" ... any note ... evidence of indebtedness, ... investment
contract,.., or any certificate of interest or participation in... any of
the foregoing."'' ° Congress hoped this broad definition would pro-
mote "full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of the many
types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the or-
dinary concept of security.""' However, many of these instruments,
like notes, are also often used in settings that do not involve invest-
103. Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or
Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 368 (1995). However, Professor Markham ar-
gues that these institutions should not, on the one hand, take advantage of deregulation
based on their apparent sophistication and then, on the other hand, take action against
their securities broker claiming that they were unsophisticated and unable to assess the
risks of a complex financial instrument. See id.
104. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,56 (1990); see also Dennis S. Corgill, Secu-
rities As Investments At Risk, 67 TUL. L. REV. 861, 864 (1993) (noting that the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act were passed to eliminate fraud in a largely unregulated securities mar-
ket).
105. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1).
106. Securities Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10).
107. The definition of "security" varies slightly in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act; how-
ever, "the coverage of the two acts may be considered the same." Reves, 494 U.S. at 65
n.1; see also Byrne, supra note 36.
108. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir.
1992) (quoting Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1)).
109. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985) (quoting SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,299 (1946) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, (1933))).
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ments." In order to avoid regulating these instruments when they
are being used in a non-security setting, the Supreme Court adopted
the "family resemblance test" in Reves v. Ernst & Young."'
Under the "family resemblance test" (the Reves test), all instru-
ments included in the definition of a "security" under the securities
laws are presumed to be securities, "unless the context otherwise re-
quires."". Courts have interpreted this statutory phrase as reserving
to them the authority to "disregard the literal language of the statute
and analyze the economic realities of the transaction... 3 The burden
is on the issuer of the financial instrument to draw out the economic
realities of the transaction and demonstrate to the court that the in-
strument is in fact being used in a non-security setting."' To do so
successfully, the issuer must show that the instrument in question
"'bear[s] a strong family resemblance' to an item on a judicially
crafted list of non-securities, or convinces the court to add a new in-
strument to the list of non-securities."".5  If the issuer successfully
demonstrates that the instrument in question does not fall within the
statutory definition of a security, a cause of action under the federal
securities laws will not be available to the plaintiff."6
In determining whether the instrument in question closely re-
sembles one of the non-security instruments on the judicially-
enumerated list, the court considers four factors (the Reves factors).
110. See Murray & Vittone, supra note 29, at 390 n.11 (noting that "the context or
transaction may determine the nature of a note as an investment vehicle" since a note
may be issued in a consumer context, a commercial context, or an investment context).
111. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that definitions in the
Acts may not apply if" 'the context otherwise' "requires).
112. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982). Courts have relied on this
statutory language which states that the definitions in the Securities Acts apply "unless
the context otherwise requires" to exclude certain transactions. See id. (noting that the
broad statutory definition of security is "preceded by the statement that the terms men-
tioned are not to be considered securities if 'the context otherwise requires' ").
113. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (noting that "form should be dis-
regarded for substance and emphasis should be on economic reality" in the determination
of what instruments constitute securities).
114. See Corgill, supra note 104, at 896 (noting that in determining if an instrument is
an investment instrument, courts "should not follow the label on the investment instru-
ment," but instead, should "take account of the economics of the transaction under
investigation").
115. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 (quoting Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross &
Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137 (1976)).
116. It is important to note that Congress only intended to regulate fraud within the
securities markets, it did not intend to create a "general federal cause of action for fraud."
United Hous. Found., Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-848; see also Corgill, supra note
104, at 865 (noting that Congress did not intend to supplant common law fraud in markets
other than the securities market).
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The Reves factors are:
(1) the motivations that would prompt a reasonable buyer
and seller to enter into the transaction; (2) the plan of dis-
tribution of the instrument; (3) the reasonable expectations
of the investing public; and (4) whether some factor, such as
the existence of another regulatory scheme, significantly re-
duces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering
application of the securities laws unnecessary."'
In Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank, 8
the Second Circuit firmed up the Reves test as the appropriate ana-
lytical framework for determining if "loan participations could be
considered notes which are also securities.'. 9 However, the "multi-
spectrum" Reves test has been criticized for being "completely open-
ended." 20 When the Supreme Court adopted the Reves test, it pro-
vided no guidance regarding the weight that should be given to each
factor.' Therefore, as the financial markets rapidly produce new and
innovative financial instruments, the Reves test provides issuers of
and investors with little predictability as to which instruments will be
considered securities."
117. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2d
Cir. 1992).
118. Id.
119. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55. The "family resemblance test" was adopted by
the Supreme Court in Reves. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 63-67. However, until the Second
Circuit revisited the family resemblance test in Banco, there was some confusion over
whether the Howey test, which had been used prior to Reves to determine if instruments
were securities would still be used. The Howey test, first articulated by the court in SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co. 1, focused on whether the participation interests at issue were
"investment contracts." However, the Second Circuit's use of the family resemblance test
reiterates that it is the new analytical framework for the determining if instruments are
securities within the scope of the securities laws.
120. Park McGinty, What is a Security? 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1033, 1076 (1993).
121. The Supreme Court adopted the Reves test despite a warning by the Second Cir-
cuit that "directing district courts to 'weigh' a number of ... factors, without any
instructions as to relative weights ... is scarcely helpful to hard-pressed district judges or
to counsel." Id. at 1077 n.198 (quoting Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544
F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1976)).
122. See id. at 1077 (noting that, by requiring courts to examine several factors, "Reves
left each court on its own to assign whatever meaning or relative weights to the different
spectra that the court desired"). The Supreme Court acknowledged this lack of predict-
ability, by noting that "an approach founded on economic reality rather than a set of per
se rules is subject to criticism that whether a particular note is a 'security' may not be
entirely clear at the time it is issued." Reves, 494 U.S. at 63 n.2.
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B. The Banco Espanol Litigation: The Second Circuit's Rejection of
"Loan Participation Notes" as "Securities" Under the 1933 and
1934 Acts
The Second Circuit was unwilling to classify loan participation
notes as securities in Banco Espanol." However, the Second Circuit
limited the scope of its opinion to the particular notes in question,
and thereby "left open the possibility that other participation
schemes may be found to be securities."124
In Banco Espanol, Security Pacific Merchant Bank (Security Pa-
cific) sold participations in loan notes owed to them by a corporate
borrower on a commercial loan.' Security Pacific sold these partici-
pations to other banks, and to nonfinancial institutions and funds."6
After the borrower defaulted on over seventy-five million dollars of
loan notes, eleven of the participants brought suit seeking to rescind
their participation agreements.27 These participants claimed that Se-
curity Pacific withheld information regarding the borrower's financial
condition, and thereby violated Section 12(2) of the Securities Act."z
After applying the Reves test, the district court concluded that the
participations were not 'securities' under the 1933 Act, and therefore,
the plaintiffs were not entitled to a cause of action under Section
12(2) of the Act. 29 Although the district court noted that a participa-
123. 973 F.2d 51 (2nd Cir. 1992)
124. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 56 (noting that the Banco court ruling only applied to
the certain participations in question).
125. See id. at 53.
126. See Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d 51, 56 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting). Although the par-
ticipants included foreign and national banks, 53% of the participants were non-bank
investors: 23% were corporations; 18% institutional investors; 4% insurance companies;
2% mutual funds; 2% trust departments; and 4% money managers. See id. at 57.
127. Although a majority of the participants in Banco were nonbank investors, eight of
the eleven plaintiffs in the case were banks. Some suggest that this made Banco "a poor
test case, from an investor protection perspective, for deciding whether loan notes are
securities." Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2120. This is because the more banks are
involved, the more the participation program looked like a traditional use of loan partici-
pation, where banks purchased and sold participations among themselves as part of the
banking business.
128. See Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 53. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act provides for
liability for fraud or misrepresentation in the interstate sale of securities, regardless of
whether or not the registration with the SEC was involved. Thus, transactions exempt
from registration with the SEC under Sections 3(a)(3) through 3(a)(8) do not escape civil
liability under Section 12(2). If fraud or misrepresentation is found, then Section 12(2)
allows the purchaser to rescind the purchase agreement. Upon tendering the security, the
purchaser can recover consideration paid for the security with interest, less the amount of
any income received from holding the instrument. See Herbert S. Wadner, et. al, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Laws, C635 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 83, 84 (1991).
129. See Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55-56.
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tion in an instrument may be a security even when the underlying in-
strument is not, the court found that these participations were
analogous to notes evidencing loans issued by banks for commercial
purposes."3 On appeal, a divided panel of the Second Circuit upheld
the district court decision, stating that the district court was correct in
finding that the participation interests in question were not securities
within the meaning of the federal securities laws.
1. Application of the Reves Family Resemblance Test to Banco
Espanol
The first Reves factor requires an examination of the transaction
in order to "assess the motivations that would prompt a reasonable
seller and buyer to enter into it."' The court then characterizes the
parties motivations as either commercial or investment.' In Banco
Espanol, the district court concluded that the originating bank was
motivated by a desire to correct the issuer's cash flow problems and
to diversify its own risks, while the participants were motivated by a
desire for short term returns on excess cash.'33 The district court
characterized these motivations as commercial and held that the
''overall motivation of the parties was the promotion of commercial
purposes and not investments in a business enterprise.""'
The second Reves factor requires a court to examine the plan of
distribution to determine if the note is an instrument in which there is
"common trading for speculation of investment."' 35 A note need not
be traded on an exchange to fulfill this requirement.3 6 The court will
find that there is 'common trading' if the notes are either traded on
130. The list of notes the Court has deemed not to be securities include:
(1) the note delivered in consumer financing; (2) the notes secured by a mort-
gage on a home; the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or
some of its assets; (4) the note evidencing a character loan to a bank customer;
(5) short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable; (6) a note
that simply formalizes an open account debt incurred in the ordinary course of
operations; and (7) notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current op-
erations.
Reves, 494 U.S. at 65.
131. See id. at 66.
132. See i at 56 (noting that a commercial purpose raises the likelihood that the in-
strument is a non-security while an investment purpose points to a security).
133. See Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55.
134. Banco Espanol de Credito, 763 F. Supp. at 42-43; but see infra notes 183-85 and
accompanying text, for a discussion of the SEC's argument that the parties had invest-
ment purposes for entering into the transaction.
135. It. at 59 (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,351 (1943)).
136. See Byrne, supra note 36.
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an exchange, or offered and sold to a broad segment of the public.37
In Banco Espanol, the district court concluded that the plan of distri-
bution was "a limited solicitation to sophisticated financial or
commercial institutions and not to the general public."' 8
The third Reves factor asks a court to consider public perception
of an instrument in order to determine if an instrument should be
deemed a 'security' based on the public's reasonable expectations. 39
The district court believed that by requiring participants to sign a
Master Participation Agreement (MPA), the originating bank had
given participants "ample notice" that they were purchasing partici-
pations in loans, not investments in a business enterprise."4
The fourth Reves factor requires an examination of regulatory
schemes to see if they provide purchasers with investor protections
similar to those provided by the federal securities laws. 4' In Banco
Espanol, the district court rendered application of the federal securi-
ties laws unnecessary since certain guidelines issued by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency address the sale of loan participa-
tions."'
C. Pollack: Expansion of "Securities" in the Context of Debt
Instruments: A Step in the Right Direction?
In 1994, a year after Banco Espanol, the Second Circuit again
applied the Reves test in Pollack v. Laidlaw Holding, Inc. , 43 to de-
termine whether certain participation interests in debt instruments
were securities. However, this time, the Second Circuit concluded
137. See id.
138. Banco Espanol de Credito, 763 F. Supp. at 42-43. The district court emphasized
that Security Pacific also limited resales of the participations without the express written
participation of the originating bank and thereby protected against sales to the general
public. But see infra notes 184-94, for a discussion of the SEC's argument that sale of
participations to institutions and funds outside of the banking world qualifies as sale to
the general public.
139. See Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55.
140. But see infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the SEC's
argument that Security Pacific's promotional material could have led the purchasers to
perceive the participations to be securities.
141. See Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55.
142. See id. But see infra notes 209-21 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the
inadequacy of these guidelines to provide purchasers with protections against fraud and
nondisclosure by the originating bank. Specifically, the guidelines (1) do not provide
purchasers with an express or implied remedy against an originating bank; (2) do not ad-
dress sale of participations to participants other than national banks; and (3) focus
primarily on the activities of purchasers of participations, thereby placing little focus on
the activities of the originating bank in a participation program.
143. Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808,815 (1994).
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that the participations in mortgages were "notes" that were
"securities" within the meaning of the federal securities laws.1"
The Pollack Court concluded that unlike the loan participations
issued in Banco Espanol, the mortgage participations sold in Pollack
were sold to the general investing public.45 The court stated that in
contrast to the marketing scheme in Banco Espanol, which was
"more analogous to a group of highly sophisticated commercial enti-
ties engaging in short-term commercial financing arrangements than
to the securities markets,' ' 46 the marketing scheme in Pollack was not
restricted to sophisticated investors with the "capacity to acquire in-
formation about the debtor."'4 7
Pollack was an important victory for the SEC and investors in
participations in debt instruments since "the applicability of the defi-
nition of security to debt instruments would have been severely and
unduly restricted" had the Second Circuit held that the mortgage par-
ticipations were not securities. "
1. Great Strides of Pollack
Two of the Second Circuit's conclusions in Pollack modify the
Reves test in a manner that will be favorable to participants in debt
instruments seeking relief under the federal securities laws. The
Pollack Court concluded that (1) priority should be given to the mo-
tives of the purchaser, not the seller, of a debt instrument, and (2)
"mere existence of other regulation is not enough to displace the fed-
eral securities laws"'49 if they do not provide risk reducing protections
for purchasers."
Remembering that securities laws are designed to protect inves-
tors, the main objectives when applying the Reves test should be to
determine if the purchasers have an investment purpose, and if so, if
another regulatory scheme provides them with investor protections.
Consistent with these objectives, the Pollack Court restricted its con-
sideration of the parties' motives to the purchasers' motivations.'
The Court rendered examination of the seller's motives unnecessary
and declared that if a "purchaser clearly has an investment motive, it
144. See id at 809.
145. See id. at 813-14.
146. Id. at 813.
147. Id. at 813-14
148. Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2127.




NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
does not matter if the seller does not."'52 This is critical since loan
participations are sold by banks and other entities in the lending
business. Since these entities are in the business of making commer-
cial loans, their motivations could almost always be deemed
commercial rather than investment.'53 Thus, "unless the purchasers'
motives are given priority, participations would never be securities
under Reves."' '4
Second, the Court stated that "mere existence of other regula-
tion is not enough to displace the federal securities laws.""'5 This is
significant since the banking circular relied on as an alternative
regulatory scheme in Banco Espanol does not provide purchasers of
loan participations with a private right of action.156 Although these
modifications to the Reves test appear to narrow Banco Espanol's
holding, Banco Espanol has not been overruled. Thus, the law in the
Second Circuit, "the most important court of appeals on financial
matters," is that loan participation interests are only subject to regu-
lation under the federal banking laws, not the federal securities laws.
157
If courts adhere to the majority's reasoning in Banco Espanol,
the inadequate investor protections provided to loan participants by
the banking laws will continue to shield seller banks from liability to
loan participants.58 This is because under the banking laws, the seller
bank is not liable to the purchasers for failure to disclose negative
credit information.1 59  However, the amended opinion in Banco
Espanol, leaves the door open for a future holding that certain non-
traditional loan participation notes are securities." Participations in
B-tranche leveraged loans function like investments, and therefore
provide the ideal framework for such a holding. However, in order
152. Id. at 2126.
153. See id at 2127.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2126.
156. See id. (citing authorities asserting that the banking regulations do not create a
private right of action and considering that the Reves court did not explain the "exact
scope" of factor four, but that it did make reference to two cases in which strong, com-
prehensive alternative protections were available to purchasers (i.e. federal deposit
insurance)).
157. Id. at 2128.
158. See id. at 2128-30.
159. For a discussion of the lack of a private action for purchasers under the banking
laws, see infra note 211 and accompanying text.
160. See Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 56
(Oakes, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the court was ruling only "with respect to the loan
particpations as marketed in this case").
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to reach such a conclusion, courts must look beyond a loan note pro-
gram's "superficial resemblance to traditional loan participations""16
and note the differences that were present in Banco Espanol and are
common to many contemporary loan note programs.
In his dissent, Judge Oakes noted that the Banco Espanol loan
note program was different from a traditional loan note program in
"several important respects, including (1) who the participants are;
(2) what the purposes of the purchasers or participants are; and (3)
what the promotional basis used in marketing the loan notes is."'62
Focusing on these three aspects of a loan note program when apply-
ing the Reves test reveals the significant differences between
traditional loan participation programs and many modern loan par-
ticipation programs. When this more exacting analysis is applied to
B-tranche participations it becomes obvious that despite their label
as loan participation notes, these participation interests are invest-
ment instruments that should be regulated as securities.
V. PREDICTING THE FATE OF PARTICIPATIONS IN THE B-TRANCHE
OF A LEVERAGED LOAN: "SECURITIES" IN DISGUISE?
A. Application of Reves Factors to Participations in the B-tranche of
a Leveraged Loan
1. First Reves Factor-Motivation of the Parties
In Reves, the Supreme Court declared that a note purchaser
"interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate"
has an investment motive.'63 Moreover, in a footnote the Supreme
Court wrote: "[w]e emphasize that by 'profit' in the context of notes,
we mean 'a valuable return on an investment,' which undoubtedly
includes interest."'' Since "one of the primary inducements" offered
to the purchasers of the promissory notes in Reves was "an interest
rate constantly revised to keep it slightly above the rate paid by local
banks and savings and loans,"'6 the Supreme Court concluded that
purchasers bought the notes in order to earn a profit and therefore
had an investment motive.'" Despite the Supreme Court's clear indi-
161. Id.
162. ld.
163. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,66 (1990).
164. Id. at 68 n.4.
165. Id at 68. The promissory notes issued in Reves were issued by a farmers coopera-
tive. See id.
166. See id. at 67-68.
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cation that a primary interest in profit suffices to show an investment
motive, the Second Circuit refused to restrict its interpretation of an
investment motive to the Supreme Court's definition.
In Banco Espanol, the district court concluded that the partici-
pants were "motivated by the desire to obtain short-term returns on
excess cash." ' 7 However, despite the presence of a profit motive, the
district court held that the "overall motivation of the parties was the
promotion of commercial purposes. '  The Banco Espanol majority
upheld the district court's finding of a commercial motive despite ar-
guments by the SEC that the loan notes "were purchased by
participants for investment purposes-for the high rate of return they
offered compared to other financial instruments-and not as part of a
commercial lending business or to facilitate an independent business
relationship with the borrower." '169 The SEC supported their argu-
ment by noting that a majority of the participants were non-financial
entities that "clearly were not acting as commercial lenders;" 7' (2)
that the promotional literature used by the seller bank in Banco
Espanol focused on the prospect of a higher return offered by loan
participations compared to commercial paper;7 ' and, (3) that "even
the banks that purchased generally did so not through their lending
departments but through their investing and trading departments."'"
Similar to the scenario in Banco Espanol, there are multiple
nonbank institutional investors among the purchasers of participa-
tions in the B-tranche of a leveraged loan. Banks market these B-
tranche participations "almost exclusively to prime rate funds and
other non-bank institutions interested in higher-yielding, floating
rate-term debt."'73 Floating interest rates are attractive to partici-
pants because they "throw off a higher yield in direct correlation to
interest rate rises."'7 4 However, B-tranche participants' loans have
lengthy exposure to a highly leveraged borrower with a low credit
rating. Furthermore, the participants do not have access to any un-
167. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55.
168. Id.
169. Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2122.
170. Id.
171. Indeed, the promotional materials advertised the loans as yielding "15 to 50 basis
points more than their commercial paper equivalents." See Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 56
(Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
172. Roberts & Quinn, supra, note 4, at 2121-22 (quoting the Brief of the SEC, Ami-
cus Curiae, at 14-43, Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1992)).
173. See LPC-Siligan Corp, supra note 9 (noting the addition of a B-tranche loan due
to the liquidity in the B-term loan market note market).
174. Dunaief, Finding Profit, supra note 7, at 24.
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derlying collateral on the loan.75 Consequently, they are unsecured
creditors, dependent on the extended cash flow of a borrowing firm
on which they have had virtually no opportunity to conduct credit
analysis.76 Clearly, these nonbank participants are not exposing
themselves to the risk inherent in these lengthy loans in order to
promote commercial lending. These investors are motivated by the
competitive returns available on investments in B-tranche leveraged
loans.
Drawing out the parallels between junk bonds and B-tranche
leveraged loan participations further demonstrates that purchasers of
B-tranche participation interests have an investment motive. In the
1980s, high yield securities became very popular and were dubbed
"junk bonds." Junk bonds are less than investment grade bonds that
offer high interest rates to reflect their default risk. Similarly, B-
tranche leveraged loans (often referred to as "junk loans")"n are less
than investment grade loans that offer high interest rates to reflect
their default risk 7 8 Therefore, one of the "primary inducements"'79
offered to the purchasers of both instruments is the high rate of re-
turn compared to other instruments. As interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Reves, purchasing a note primarily to earn profit through
interest constitutes an investment purpose."is Following this ration-
ale, a participant whose primary interest in purchasing a loan
participation is to profit from high interest rates has an investment
motive.
2. Second Reves Factor-Plan of Distribution
Under the second Reves factor the Court must "examine the
plan of distribution of the note to determine whether the instrument
is commonly traded for speculation or investment.''. Ironically,
notes do not need to be traded to fulfill this prong of the Reves test; a
175. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
177. See Stephen Barr, All's Fair in Love and Loans, 10 CFO: THE MAGAZINE FOR
SENIOR FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES 83,83 (1994).
178. See Gorton & Haubrich, supra note 21, at 87 (noting the similarity of the loan
sales market to the junk bond market). As the loan sales market has matured, originating
banks increasingly sell participations in loans to firms that are not publicly traded for
lengthy maturities. In addition, "[b]ecause most of the loans sold are to firms without
access to the commercial paper market, the loan sales market is not simply a substitute
for commercial paper. It, perhaps, most closely resembles the junk bond market." See id.
(statement of Gary B. Gorton).
179. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,68 (1990).
180. Id. at 67-68.
181. Id. at 66.
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note need only be "offered and sold to a broad segment of the pub-
lic."1 The courts have not clearly defined what constitutes a broad
segment of the public."
Despite the presence of many nonbank financial institutional in-
vestors in the Banco Espanol participation scheme, the Banco
Espanol majority held that the loan notes had not been sold to a
broad segment of the public since Security Pacific only offered the
loan notes to "sophisticated financial and commercial institutions,"
and resale of the notes was explicitly prohibited without its permis-
sion, thereby preventing resale to unsophisticated individuals."M In
contrast, the SEC argued that Security Pacific's sale of loan notes to
institutions and funds outside of the traditional banking system rep-
resented sale to the general investment public.' Disregarding the
SEC's argument, the Banco Espanol majority did not distinguish be-
tween banks and other types of institutional purchasers and did not
focus on these institutions' ability to obtain full credit information on
the borrower as the defining element of the general public stan-
dard."
A year later in Pollack, the Second Circuit held that certain
mortgage participation interests were sold to the general public since
they were offered and sold to "nonsophisticated investors"' 7 lacking
the "capacity to acquire information about the debtor."'" Members
of the SEC were pleased with this outcome and the emphasis the
Second Circuit placed on the purchasers' access to full credit infor-
mation."' However, the question remains whether the Second
Circuit will continue to presume that large institutions (whether they
are financial or nonfinancial) have access to full credit information;
182. Id. at 68.
183. See Kornegay, supra note 25, at 838-39 (explaining the debate over what consti-
tutes selling to the general public). There are two distinct arguments in the debate over
selling to the general public:
On the one hand, an issuer could argue that loan participations are not sold
broadly to the public but rather to large institutions. But as Gorton points out,
loan sales are increasingly sold outside the banking system to parties whose
business and expertise many not be in credit evaluation.
Id. at 838-39.
184. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir.
1992).
185. See Byrne, supra note 36.
186. See id; see also Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2123.
187. The purchasers in Pollack included two doctors, one of the doctors' sons, the doc-
tors' retirement plan, and a family trust. See Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F. 3d
808,809 (2d Cir. 1994).
188. Id at 814.
189. See Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2126.
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or whether they will recognize that many nonfinancial institutions,
like unsophisticated individuals, "have virtually no opportunity to
conduct any due diligence regarding the borrower except by review-
ing public documents provided by the lead lender."' ' 9 A court that
does distinguish between banks and other institutional purchasers
(and recognizes that many of the latter are not making purchase deci-
sions based on full credit information), will realize that nonfinancial
institutions can be defrauded or misled by the originating bank as
easily as an unsophisticated individual. Realizing this, a court should
agree with the SEC and conclude that sale of participations to nonfi-
nancial institutions and funds outside of the banking world should be
construed as sales to the general investment public. 9' Defining the
general public standard in this manner would benefit B-tranche pur-
chasers which are primarily nonbank institutional investors or
funds. 92 The growing presence of these nonbank investors in the sec-
ondary loan market should force courts to consider the interests of
(1) nonfinancial institutional investors, and (2) "unsophisticated in-
vestors"'93 with "financial stakes"'" in mutual and pension funds, both
of whom are injured by an originating bank's failure to reveal the
risks involved in the underlying loan.
3. Third Reves Factor-Public's Reasonable Expectations
Under the third Reves factor, "[i]nstruments can be deemed se-
curities on the basis of the reasonable perceptions of the public, even
when an economic analysis of the transaction suggests otherwise.""5
The Reves Court recognized that the "fundamental essence" of a
"security" is its character as an "investment."'" Thus, if the court de-
termines that the "reasonable perception of the instrument by the
investing public," is that of an "investment", the court may consider
the note to be a security."" In Reves, the promotional literature re-
ferred to the notes at issue as "investments."'98 The court focused its
190. See Byrne, supra note 36.
191. See id
192. See Dunaief, Finding Profit, supra note 7, at 24 (noting that Bank of Boston is
"one of few banks to join the prime rate funds and institutional investors who tradition-
ally sit on the other side of the loan syndication table").
193. Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2130.
194. Id
195. Kornegay, supra note 25, at 839.
196. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,68-69 (1990).
197. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir.
1992).
198. Reves, 494 U.S. at 69.
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
attention on these advertisements and noted that since (i) they char-
acterized the notes as securities and (ii) "there were no
countervailing factors that would have led a reasonable person to
question this characterization,"1 the public could have perceived the
instruments to be investment instruments.
In contrast to the Supreme Court in Reves, the Second Circuit
majority in Banco Espanol did not mention the marketing methods
used to promote the loan participation notes.m Instead, the court
focused on the seller's requirement that each purchaser sign an MPA.
The majority believed that requiring the "sophisticated purchasers"
to sign participation agreements gave them "notice through the con-
tractual provisions of the MPA that the loan notes were not
investments in a business enterprise."2'
On the other hand, the SEC focused on the originating bank's
methods of marketing participations and argued that the purchasers
would reasonably expect the loan notes to be securities since the
originating bank framed its promotional literature in terms com-
monly used in the securities market and presented the loan notes as
"equivalent" to commercial paper.m Specifically, the promotional
literature for the Banco Espanol notes: "(1) represented the Loan
Notes as competitive with commercial paper, (2) referred to Security
Pacific as a 'trader' and 'distributor,' (3) referred to potential Partici-
pants as 'investors,' and (4) stressed the wide range of issuers,
maturities, and amounts of the loan notes."20' 3 However, the Banco
Espanol majority did not agree with the SEC's arguments and firmly
stated that "in the case of an arm's length transactions between fi-
nancial institutions, no fiduciary relationship exists unless one was
created in the participation agreement."
Lead lenders are wise to the protections of participation agree-
ments and require purchasers of B-tranche loans to sign participation
agreements containing disclaimer provisions. These provisions ex-
plicitly waive any duty on the part of the originating bank to disclose
financial information on the borrower to participants. Particularly
after Banco Espanol, the originating bank can easily manipulate this
prong of the Reves test. To protect themselves from liability, lead
199. Id.
200. See Byrne, supra note 36.
201. See id.
202. See Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2122.
203. Byrne, supra note 36.




lenders should (1) require the purchaser sign a separate participation
agreement for each transaction; (2) include a provision stating that
the purchaser has conducted its own due diligence and credit analysis;
(3) prohibit resales without the lead lender's express written permis-
sion; (4) identify notes as interests in underlying loans, not
investments; and (5) avoid use of securities language in the promo-
tional materials or participation agreement2 5 However, a sharper
focus on marketing will reveal that many originating banks refer to
loan participations as an equivalent to commercial paper.
4. Reves Factor Four-Alternate Regulatory Scheme
Finally, under the fourth Reves factor, a note is not a security if
"4... some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme
significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering
application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.""" The Banco
Espanol majority held that Banking Circular 181,° issued by the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency, was an adequate substitute
for the federal securities laws since it contained "specific policy
guidelines addressing the sale of loan participations." '  However, the
Court stopped short of examining OCC 181 guidelines to ensure that
they would provide participants with protections against nondisclo-
sure, fraud, or misrepresentation by the originating bank.
a. The Inadequacies of Circular 181
The OCC 181 guidelines do not provide adequate legal protec-
tion to purchasers of bank loan participations.2' The inability of
OCC 181 to protect purchasers from nondisclosure of risks, fraud or
misrepresentation on the part of the originating bank stem from
three main factors: (1) its guidelines are mostly geared towards the
activities of the purchasers and insufficiently regulate the activities of
banks selling loan participations;21 (2) the Office of the Comptroller
205. See Byrne, supra note 36.
206. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,67 (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551,557-59 & n.7 (1982)).
207. See, e.g., Loan Participations by National Banks, Banking Circular 181, Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 60,799 (Aug. 2, 1984) [hereinafter Banking Circular 181].
208. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55.
209. See Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 804 (noting that banking regulations pro-
tect bank depositors but, "afford no protection to purchasers of bank assets against a
selling bank's fraud, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure"). Federal banking law does not
provide a private right of action to participants. See id.
210. Cf. Byrne, supra note 36. Although Banking Circular 181 (OCC 181) does not
provide legal protections for purchasers of participation interests, its guidelines do rec-
ommend "meaningful actions" that purchasers can take to protect themselves. In general
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of the Currency's jurisdiction is limited to national banks so its
guidelines do not cover the sale of participation interests to other en-
tities; and (3) OCC 181 does not provide purchasers with any express
or implied remedies against banks selling loan participations.21' Con-
sequently, without the protections of the securities laws, purchasers
of loan participation interests are forced to rely on common law
fraud or breach of contract claims. 212 Claims based on common law
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing are normally rejected if the parties entered into a
loan participation agreement. 3  Loan participations typically state
that the purchaser purchased the participation based on an inde-
pendent evaluation of the borrower's financial situation .2 4  The
courts rely on this language to assert that the originating bank ab-
solved itself of any duty to provide participants with information
regarding the borrower's creditworthiness, and therefore, a partici-
pant could not have reasonably relied on the originating lender in its
decision to purchase a loan participation.15
In sum, many of the purchasers of loan participations in
Tranche-B loans are nonbank institutions. These institutions lack
expertise in credit evaluation and participation agreements deprive
them of an opportunity to verify the representations given to them by
the bank on the borrower's financial condition.1 Furthermore, origi-
these include: (1) maintaining written policies and procedures governing purchase of
participation interests; (2) conducting an independent credit analysis of the borrower to
determine if this is a credit risk the purchaser would take directly; and (3) obtaining an
agreement from the seller bank that they will continually provide the purchaser with
credit information which may affect quality of the purchaser's interest. See Banking Cir-
cular 181, supra note 207.
211. See i (noting that OCC 181 appears to be the only direct attempt by the federal
government to regulate the activities of banks involved in the sale and purchase of loan
activities, and asserting that the guidelines: mainly relate to the activities of the purchas-
ers, not the sellers of loan participations; do not govern entities other than national banks;
and do not provide purchasers with remedies).
212. See id.
213. See Mannino, supra note 39; see also Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d 56 (rejecting the
plaintiffs contractual and other common-law claims since the waiver provision in the
MPA's signed by participants "specifically absolved Security Pacific of any responsibility
to disclose information relating to Integrated's [the borrower] financial condition"). The
Second Circuit also asserted that "as an arms length transaction between sophisticated
financial institutions, the law imposed no independent duty on Security Pacific to disclose
information that plaintiffs could have discovered through their own efforts." Id In addi-
tion, the Second Circuit recently upheld a dismissal of fraud claims brought by a foreign
bank participant against a U.S. bank acting as an originating lender. See Banque Arabe et
Internationale D'Investissment v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 57 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 1995).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 35-41, for a discussion of the inability of nonfinancial institutional
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nating banks use contractual provisions to absolve themselves of any
duty to disclose negative credit information to participants, and fed-
eral banking law does not provide participants with a private right of
action for nondisclosure, fraud or misrepresentation by the originat-
ing bank."7 Consequently, if these institutions want to purchase loan
participations, they are forced to do so with minimal credit informa-
tion about the borrowing firm. However, by refocusing the fourth
Reves factor on risk-reduction, the Pollack court presented a more
promising forecast for these nonbank participants. The Pollack
Court achieved this focus by noting that the "mere existence of an
alternate regulatory scheme is not enough to displace the federal se-
curities laws."2 ' Therefore, although a regulatory scheme may
address a particular instrument, courts will no longer consider it to be
a sufficient substitute for the federal securities laws unless it provides
purchasers with "comprehensive and strong protections for purchas-
ers such that investment risk is substantially eliminated." '219 Applying
this more rigorous "risk-reducing" analysis to OCC 181 would reveal
(1) that OCC 181 does not regulate the activities of banks selling loan
participations; (2) that it cannot govern the activities of entities other
than national banks; and (3) it does not provide purchasers with any
express or implied remedies.
In contrast, under the securities laws, participants would have
access to Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act which would allow a partici-
pant to rescind the participation agreement if the originating bank
made materially false or misleading statements about the borrower's
financial condition.2" Furthermore, a defrauded purchaser of a loan
participation may be able to bring a private fraud action for damages
under Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act (unless a loan participation fell
within the Act's exemptions for certain types of commercial paper),."
Similar remedies against fraud and misrepresentation are completely
investors to verify credit information on the borrower.
217. See supra note 211 and accompanying text, for a discussion of OCC 181's failure
to provide participants with a private right of action.
218. Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2126 (citing Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc.,
27 F.3d 808, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1994)).
219. Id. at 2127 (noting that the 10th Circuit statement that "the risk-reducing factor
must essentially guarantee the individual's investment" (quoting Uselton v. Commercial
Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 565,582 (10th Cir.))).
220. § 12(2).
221. See Corgill, supra note 104, at 867 n.20 (discussing the debate over the scope of
the Acts' exemptions for short-term notes); see also J. William Hicks, Exempted Transac-
tions Under the 1933 Act (1990 Looseleaf) (discussing Rule 10b-5 as a remedy against
"'fraud' generally (i.e., devices, schemes, acts or practices) and not merely misrepresen-
tations or omissions to state material facts" in the purchase or sale of securities).
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absent from the federal banking guidelines on loan participations.
Thus, the federal banking laws should not be regarded as an adequate
substitute for the federal securities laws in the context of loan par-
ticipations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal banking law and the federal securities laws "rest on the
empirically bankrupt assumption that bank assets are not market-
able."' However, sale of participations in B-tranche leveraged loans
to nonbank institutions and funds is a first rate example of commer-
cial banks' "evolution out of old style-banking into investment
banking, in an effort to compete with the borrowing of money
through debt instruments, such as commercial paper, rather than
through traditional bank loans."m Commercial banks have increas-
ingly transformed their assets into marketable financial instruments
by taking assets from their own balance sheet and selling them to in-
vestors. This increased marketability of bank assets has created an
overlap between banking activities and securities activities."4 Unfor-
tunately, the federal regulations have not caught up with these
market developments and continue to regulate banking activities and
securities activities under dissimilar regulatory schemes.2m Conse-
quently, a bank-sponsored financial instrument, like a B-tranche loan
participation, "may only be subject to laws designed primarily to pro-
tect bank depositors and to maintain the safety and soundness of the
banking system and thereby avoid application of the federal securi-
ties laws, which were designed to protect investors."
' ' 6
Regulations which provide investment risk protections should be
applied to loan participations in order to encompass institutional in-
vestors who lack the expertise or resources to assess the risks
involved in loan participation. Making loan participations subject to
federal securities regulation would "resolve the problems of asym-
metric information in the market, address the incentives commercial
banks have to shirk their duties in loan monitoring, encourage confi-
dence in the market, and ultimately foster its growth."' 7 Although
222. Kornegay, supra note 25, at 802.
223. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 58 (2d Cir.
1992) (Oakes C.J., dissenting).
224. See Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2115-2116 (noting the blurring of distinc-
tions between commercial banking and securities activities)
225. See id. at 2116.
226. Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2116.
227. Kornegay, supra note 25, at 850.
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some parties are concerned that requiring banks to comply with dis-
closure requirements will increase the cost of loan participations and
make them less competitive with other debt instruments, protecting
investors should be of primary concern. Investors purchasing in-
vestment instruments in different markets should not be subject to
different levels of protection based on artificial distinctions between
banking activities and securities activities. 9  Originating banks
should be required to provide participants, regardless of their institu-
tional status, with enough information to allow them to understand
the conditions and risks of the loan participations being sold.m
Some might suggest that this goal could be similarly achieved by
amending the federal banking regulations to impose disclosure re-
quirements on originating banks and provide purchasers of bank-
sponsored financial instruments with remedies for misrepresentation
or fraud. However, if regulators and courts are truly dedicated to
focusing on the economic realities of a transaction, and not on artifi-
cial labels placed on financial instruments, in order to determine
which instruments are investment instruments subject to the federal
securities laws, then a uniform scheme of regulation should be ap-
plied. Ultimately, "[t]ransactions that in substance are securities
activities should be governed by a uniform set of rules, consistently
applied by a single expert regulator-the SEC-to all market partici-
pants, regardless of whether those participants are banks or securities
firms.""' Thus, the statutory definition of "security" should be
amended to include certain loan participations. This will properly
arm B-tranche participants, which are often dependent on the origi-
nating bank's assessment of the risk involved in an investment, with
investor protections against nondisclosure, misrepresentation, or
fraud on the part of the originating bank. Moreover, it will move the
regulatory system a step closer to eliminating the artificial distinc-
tions that exist between commercial banking and investment banking
activities.
LOUISA C. CRAMPTON
228. See Murray & Vittone, supra note 29, at 415 (asserting that applying the federal
securities laws to loan participations would "merely increase the costs in this area and
stifle innovation in the banking industry").
229. See Kornegay, supra note 25, at 805 (asserting that courts and regulators "should
abandon the artificial and formalistic distinctions between the financial activities of com-
mercial and investment banks").
230. See Roberts & Quinn, supra note 4, at 2130 (noting that applying disclosure re-
quirements on the originating bank in a loan participation would keep them from
"marketing a product that potentially exposes purchasers to inadequately exposed risks").
231. Id. at 2131.
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